[BITList] Nelson's best

[John Feltham]

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> To read this Life of the Day complete with a picture of the subject,
> visit http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/lotw/2011-12-12
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> Hood,  Samuel, first Viscount Hood  (1724-1816), naval officer, born on 12 December 1724 in Butleigh, Somerset, was the eldest son of Samuel Hood (d. 1777), vicar of Butleigh and prebendary of Wells, and Mary Hoskins. Both parents came from Dorset, the father being a younger son of Alexander Hood, squire of Mosterton, and the mother a daughter of Richard Hoskins of Beaminster. The sea was nowhere in Hood's background. Samuel and his younger brother Alexander Hood may well have been charmed by Captain Thomas Smith's tales of navy life when he stayed overnight at Butleigh in 1740. Smith is known to have occasionally visited Butleigh Court, the country house of his cousin James Grenville. Alexander went aboard Smith's Romney (50 guns) a few months before Samuel, who was entered for pay on 6 May 1741 but must have joined the ship in March before she sailed for Newfoundland. At sixteen he was somewhat older than most boys who aspired to be naval officers and thus had time to become more broadly educated.
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> Early naval career, 1742-1755
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> Smith was arguably the best guardian and mentor that a youngster entering the navy could have. Thomas Grenville succeeded Smith as the Romney's captain in 1742 in the Mediterranean, and Hood followed Grenville to the Guarland in April 1743. In November Hood was rated a midshipman in the Sheerness, under Captain George Bridges Rodney. He moved with Rodney to the Ludlow Castle, leaving her on 23 January 1746 for service under Smith who had just been given command of a squadron patrolling the coast of Scotland in consequence of the Jacobite rising of 1745. As commodore, Smith was able to appoint Hood acting lieutenant of the Winchelsea (20 guns) on 17 May; the promotion, seconded by her captain, Henry Dyve, was confirmed by the Admiralty a month later.
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> The ship was ordered from the North Sea to the channel where, during a fierce and ultimately successful action near the Isles of Scilly with the Subtile (26 guns), Hood was wounded in the hand. In March 1748 he went on the Greenwich (50 guns) under Captain John Montagu, but Smith was quickly able to persuade Rear-Admiral Charles Watson to take Hood as third lieutenant of his flagship, the Lyon (60 guns), on a voyage to North America. On her return in November, the Lyon was paid off.
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> While on half pay at Portsmouth Hood married, on 25 August 1749, Susannah Linzee (1726-1806), daughter of Edward Linzee, a prominent surgeon and apothecary who was active in borough politics and frequently held the office of mayor. She was twenty-three and within a year a son was born, named Samuel. Hood plunged into Portsmouth politics with gusto. In October 1750 the infant was elected a junior burgess of the corporation but he died six months later. Hood remained in close touch with Admiral Smith and in January 1753 he was appointed a lieutenant of the guardship Invincible, from which he transferred in May to the Terrible, also a guardship at Portsmouth. A squadron preparing for the East Indies offered hopes of promotion and Hood was eager to go if he could be placed favourably for filling a vacancy, but a better option arose in early 1754 when his father-in-law got word that the captain of the sloop Jamaica, stationed at South Carolina, was 'as far gone as a man can be and alive'. There may have been help from Sir Richard Lyttelton, but it seems clear that Edward Linzee, who went up to London to solicit Lord Anson personally, was the main cause of Hood's gaining the rank of master and commander. Towards the end of June he took passage to Charles Town. Although career advantage may have been in his mind when he married Susannah Linzee, he found, as he confided to Smith, the parting 'very severe. I did not think it would have affected me so much, but I find I love my sweet wench better than I thought for'  (Wyndham, 2.102).
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> Hood arrived in America on 8 August 1754. He had anticipated that South Carolina's warm climate would soothe his intestinal disorders and found that he liked 'the face of the country' and was 'treated with ... civility and respect by all the best of the people'; they were 'all prodigiously kind'. Only one thing was missing, he told Smith: 'if Susan should come to me (which I have earnestly desired if no war) I shall then be happy indeed!'  (Wyndham, 2.106). He wrote this from Hampton Roads in early May 1755 in company with Commodore Augustus Keppel who had been assisting General Braddock, so he well knew that war with the French was possible; yet his extravagant optimism regarding the upcoming British and colonial operations in North America allowed him to hope that the French might give up. Susan stayed in Portsmouth, and the sloop Jamaica was placed under Commodore Charles Holmes. After Hood distinguished himself in an action with a French squadron off Louisbourg on 27 July 1756, Holmes posted him as captain of his flagship Grafton (70 guns), not knowing that the Admiralty had already posted Hood for the Lively (20 guns).
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> Post captain, 1756-1780
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> The Grafton came home in late 1756. At thirty-two Hood was not a young captain, yet not too old for good career prospects. Highly regarded by first-rate professional mentors (Smith, Watson, Holmes), he could also look to his father-in-law's influence and his connection through Smith and James Grenville to the 'cousinhood'-Lytteltons, Grenvilles, and Pitts-who had just moved into high offices of state. Lord Temple (Richard Grenville) was now first lord, and Hood-'no ways inclined to be idle ashore'-wrote that he would be happy to take over temporarily for any captain required ashore for the court martial of Admiral Byng. Consequently in spring 1757 he commanded three ships in rapid succession: the Torbay (70 guns), the Tartar (35 guns), and the Antelope (50 guns). In the last he found an opportunity to prove himself in command when, on 14 May 1757, he espied three sail off Brittany. Pursuing the largest, the Aquilon (50 guns), he chased, engaged, and drove her on the rocks in Audierne Bay, where she became a total wreck. A week later he captured a 'small snow' bound from Bordeaux to Canada, and on 25 May a 16-gun privateer. The Admiralty rewarded him on 14 July with permanent command of the Bideford (20 guns), attached to Sir Edward Hawke's squadron cruising in the Bay of Biscay.
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> On 7 February 1758 Hood was given command of the Vestal (32 guns); he took part in Hawke's second foray into Basque Roads and the destruction of the fortifications on the Isle of Aix, but during most of the year he cruised the channel approaches between Ushant and Ireland. Early in 1759, on the way out to North America with Commodore Holmes's squadron, Hood encountered off Cape Finisterre (21 February) the French frigate Bellona, also carrying 32 guns. He chased and engaged; in a running battle of more than three hours the Bellona was devastated and she struck. The Vestal, heavily damaged, returned to Portsmouth with her prize; her victorious captain was presented to the king by Lord Anson. After refitting, the Vestal patrolled off Le Havre, where an invasion flotilla of flat-bottomed boats had been collected. She formed part of a bombardment squadron that succeeded in destroying them (4 to 6 July 1759). Rodney, who supervised from on board the Vestal, gave all credit for positioning the bomb vessels in darkness to Hood and two other officers, the assigned pilots proving useless. By spring 1760 the war in the Atlantic was winding down, and on 30 April Hood asked to be sent to the Mediterranean, mainly, it appears, for genuine reasons of health. 'For ten years past,' he explained, 'I have been afflicted more or less with a bilious disorder, which has been very severe within these nine months as to confine me to my cabin for many days together'  (DNB). Again he looked for a warmer climate. The Vestal carried out Sir Charles Saunders's orders to scour the Spanish coast and then headed for the Levant. Hood was occupied mainly in Mediterranean convoy service until the war ended.
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> On his return home in 1763 Hood found that his most important naval patrons had died, yet his service reputation was well established and he was soon employed in the privileged position of captain of the guardship Thunderer at Portsmouth. In February 1764 he requested leave to take the waters at Bath, and again in September when he asked for two months 'to fortify my stomach against the winter', something to which he felt entitled because he had 'served the whole of the last war, without asking a single day's' absence from duty  (TNA: PRO, ADM 1/1898, 13 February and 2 Sept 1764). In summer 1765 the ship carried a regiment of foot from Ireland to Halifax. Edward Linzee became mayor of Portsmouth for a fifth time in 1766 and Sir Edward Hawke, the first lord, was one of the borough's MPs; it was not surprising that Hood should be favoured by appointment to the North American station in April 1767 as commander-in-chief.
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> Hood's base was Halifax and except for the cold climate the assignment promised to be pleasant, quiet, and advantageous (Robert and John Linzee were with him and he secured promotions for both), but it came to be dominated by the storm of protest aroused in Boston by the 'Townshend duties'. Hood sent the Romney there in May 1768 but did not go himself until November. He planned to stay only through that winter but remained in Boston until late July 1769. To provide him with enough warships for moving troops, since transports for the purpose could not be hired locally, his authority was extended to encompass the entire Atlantic coast. Initially Hood favoured strict enforcement of the revenue laws, but by February 1769 he had observed the spread of opposition throughout the colonies and was 'apprehensive it will be a task no ways easy to bring America to acknowledge (I mean the assemblies) the Power of Great Britain's Parliament to tax it'. He therefore became 'very circumspect ... not to widen, but rather to heal, the unhappy breach'  (TNA: PRO, ADM 1/483, 27 February and 26 March 1769). Thereafter his dispatches aimed at dissuading the home government from acting provocatively; he did not believe there would be armed rebellion. Later in 1769 Hood was at Halifax supervising improvements to the yard facilities, and he did not return to Boston until ordered there in September 1770; his successor arrived on 10 October.
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> Hood commanded the guardship Royal William at Portsmouth from January 1771 to November 1773. During this time he settled into a country house at Catherington, near Horndean, and rode 10 miles to work. Spending very little time on half pay, he was next appointed to the guardship Marlborough. As she was clearing for the dock on 5 July 1776 she suffered a powder explosion that killed almost twenty people (men, women, and children) and wounded fifty. Turned over with officers and crew into the Courageux (74 guns), Hood spent most of 1777 at sea, first in raising men, then in cruising to protect trade from Cape Finisterre to the channel. Hood was happy to find that despite her size she chased extremely well and could frighten off American privateers, though he made no captures. Upon returning to port in early February 1778 he accepted a civil appointment as resident commissioner of the navy and governor of the Royal Naval Academy at Portsmouth. He was now fifty-three and thinking about his health, but he accepted the position on condition that it would not preclude an eventual return to active service as a flag officer. Also, by soliciting and obtaining command of the Courageux for his unemployed brother, Alexander, he was able to give some continuity to the careers of his followers, one of whom was the earl of Chatham's third son, whom Lady Chatham had entrusted to his care (James, who died of disease in the West Indies in 1781).
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> Spring 1778 was a time of feverish mobilization for impending war with France. George III journeyed to Portsmouth in May to witness the preparations and took the occasion to discuss with Hood the entry into the navy of his third son, Prince William. He took notice of Hood's energy in forwarding 'the business of the Dockyard'  (Extracts, ed. Laughton, 1.225) and forthwith created Hood a baronet. As Sir Samuel, an officer very favourably noticed by the king, he could not help looking at his career from a new perspective. Upon declaration of war with France he wrote to Lord North reminding him that he was still available for sea service, further remarking that he had not politically identified himself with the Pitts and Grenvilles but had instead both publicly and privately supported the government. For whatever reason, he was kept on as commissioner. Two years later, as promotions to rear-admiral were speeding up, he wrote to Lord Sandwich, the first lord, expressing his 'very great desire of hoisting [his] flag and serving in the military line'  (Private Papers of ... Sandwich, 3.161) and claiming that he had accepted the commissionership not out of inclination but to accommodate the government. After some very impatient waiting Hood's plea finally got results. In mid-September 1780 a letter from the Admiralty arrived asking him whether, if there was a promotion of admirals, he would accept his flag and go to the West Indies. Lord Sandwich needed someone to serve as second-in-command to the demanding, irascible Rodney after Hyde Parker, unable to stand him any more, resigned. Faced with a defection of opposition whig officers and the reluctance of others to serve under Rodney, the first lord remembered Hood, who had twice served under Rodney without serious friction.
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> Amazingly Hood turned the offer down; he cited 'bodily infirmities' so long continued that he was without 'spirits' and would 'only be the shadow of a flag officer'. Two days later, however, he wrote again, rather urgently, saying that he would like to accept; he added: 'a warm climate will tend more towards removing my complaints than any assistance I can get at home'  (Private Papers of ... Sandwich, 3.228-9). Reconsideration of his health prospects may have been linked to news that Edward Linzee was sure to be elected mayor again, making Hood's presence less critical, yet this flag promotion and assignment was the chance of a lifetime, so a third explanation seems more compelling. For more than a year, in the wake of the notorious Keppel-Palliser court martial, Sir Samuel had been striving to rescue the career of his younger brother, who had corrected his ship's log, perhaps legitimately, but in a way that favoured Palliser's accusations. Alexander was castigated for this by the officer corps and the public, and Lord Sandwich found it prudent to turn his back on him. In refusing the offer Hood had asked Sandwich to protect and favour Alexander. No record of a promise from the first lord regarding Alexander survives, but in the extensive promotion of 26 September the brothers were elevated to rear-admiral simultaneously.
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> West Indies and North America, 1781-1783
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> As rear-admiral of the blue Hood hoisted his flag in the Barfleur (98 guns) and departed with eight of the line and the trade on 19 November to join Rodney in the West Indies. After leading an advanced division in the expedition against St Eustatius in January 1781 he took station to windward of Martinique with eighteen of the line in imminent expectation of an arriving French squadron and convoy. Because Rodney remained at St Eustatius looking after the booty Hood held independent command. Hood was not free to decide where to position his force, however; he chose the windward station, but after five weeks of futile cruising (the French force was much delayed) Rodney ordered him to leeward. Hood repeatedly wrote to try to reverse his chief's decision, knowing that from leeward he would have little chance of preventing the enemy from gaining shelter under Martinique's guns should the escort commander choose to avoid battle. But Rodney held him to leeward. Hood believed that Rodney's main motive was to ensure that the six warships already at Martinique were blockaded, to prevent them from attacking the loot to be transported from St Eustatius.
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> On the morning of 29 April the French squadron, twenty of the line, came round the southern end of the island, the storeships hugging the shore. Although Hood had got word of their arrival from one of his frigates during the night, his attempt to close was frustrated by the adverse current and very light, sometimes non-existent breezes. Four of the line from Fort Royal joined Admiral de Grasse's already strong squadron. Outnumbered and with crews weakened by lack of refreshment, Hood had to be wary. De Grasse chose not to press an attack, but during a long-range skirmish six of Hood's ships were damaged and he had to retire to Antigua for repairs.
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> Everyone knew that the battle fleets would go to North America for the hurricane season, but no one on the British side anticipated that de Grasse, co-operating with the American army in a secret plan that required assured naval superiority, would take his entire fleet. Before sailing for home Rodney gave Hood most of the available ships, fourteen of the line. With these Hood left Antigua on 10 August and reached the American coast before de Grasse. Not finding him in the Chesapeake or Delaware bays he went to New York to join the ships of Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves. Clearly, the best course was to attack de Grasse's squadron before seven French warships at Rhode Island could join it; only after vehement remonstrations could Hood persuade Graves of the urgency. Graves, slightly senior to Hood, was in command when the British fleet, numbering nineteen of the line, arrived off the entrance to the Chesapeake on the morning of 5 September 1781. As soon as the tide permitted (around noon), de Grasse began to work his twenty-four of the line out of the bay.
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> Afterwards Hood claimed that the obvious move would have been for Graves to fall upon the French van speedily, concentrating the entire British line upon it as soon as it came out. This would undoubtedly have been a wise proceeding since the remaining French ships were only slowly getting clear of Cape Henry. But Graves tried to execute an orthodox form of battle and spent hours in manoeuvring to achieve the parallel extended line that he wanted. All the while the French were assembling their superior force, and not until 4.15 p.m. did firing begin. The vans clashed, but most of Graves's line, approaching on an angle, was beyond range. He realized that he must try to bring his whole force into action, but the manoeuvring example set by his flagship in the centre was inadequate (it turned parallel and began firing at too great a distance), and his signals, based on complex and unfamiliar fighting instructions inherited from his predecessor, sowed confusion. Time ran out as sunset ended the battle.
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> Hood commanded the rear division. His decision to remain in line ahead until the battle was almost over kept the rear entirely out of action and does not cast him in a good light. Granted, he felt constrained by Graves's line ahead signal which, until it was hauled down at 5.30 p.m., seemed to negate (remembering Graves's many signals for dressing the line) the simultaneous signal to engage. The next day Graves issued a clarifying instruction which amounted to admission of a problem. Both admirals knew that when sea battles went awry the burden of censure almost always fell upon an officer who failed to adhere to the discipline of the line. Yet posterity must find it difficult to forgive a man of Hood's temper and energy for allowing tactical confusion to trump a signal for close action, even though little could have been done to hurt a retiring enemy so late in the day. By the end of September it was realized that Lord Cornwallis's situation was desperate and the navy could do nothing to help him.
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> Hood's record as an admiral had thus far not shown anything commendable. His overblown claim that he was 'conscious of no one omission' in managing his ships prior to or during the action off Martinique  (Private Papers of ... Sandwich, 4.155-9) suggests the opposite. With regard to the battle of the Chesapeake it cannot be assumed that if the chief responsibility had been his, he would have had the quick perception and resolve to attack the French van with an improvised line. (Neither he nor Graves was aware on 5 September of Cornwallis's dire predicament.) When he returned to the Caribbean as a commander-in-chief, however, his actions began to disclose the qualities of leadership for which he is remembered. Even before leaving New York he began to reveal some of them: he persuaded Graves's successor, Rear-Admiral Robert Digby, to release four battleships for Caribbean operations until spring, making the bargain attractive by a generous offer to share all prize money until the ships were returned. In consequence Hood commanded a substantial squadron, and he raised it to a high level of fighting efficiency by exercises on voyage. Although still outnumbered, he was nevertheless confident. 'I will seek and give battle to the Count De Grasse,' he wrote to the Admiralty, 'be his numbers as they may'  (Letters, ed. Hannay, 62).
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> This he did. When the French attacked St Kitt's, Hood proceeded with his twenty-two of the line against de Grasse's twenty-nine. His plan, carefully confided to the whole squadron in advance, was to attack the three rear ships of the French line at the Basseterre anchorage in succession. It was frustrated by a collision between his lead battleship and a frigate, enabling de Grasse to stand out to sea, and next morning, 25 January 1782, Hood decided that the best chance to save the island was to seize the anchorage. He made a feint towards the French fleet, drawing it seaward, and then raced towards the anchorage. Belatedly de Grasse sought to thwart him, but Hood sent a frigate ahead to give his van precise instructions for entering and anchoring in succession. The plan provided mutual cover for his divisions and resulted in a tight line sealing Frigate Bay. Thus Hood had interposed his ships between the French fleet and their army ashore. With springs to their cables they could direct their broadsides and de Grasse's attacks were driven off. The British land force, however, even using Hood's marines, was insufficient, and when the Brimstone Hill garrison capitulated Hood knew that the French would bring shore batteries against his squadron, trapping it between them and the French fleet, which now numbered thirty-two. After re-embarking his marines, Hood on 14 February summoned flag officers followed by lieutenants from the whole squadron to his cabin and required them to synchronize their watches by his chronometer. At 11 o'clock that night every ship cut its cable without signal and departed, the enemy remaining unaware until near dawn that the anchorage was empty. This campaign though futile was the making of Hood's reputation, and its daring and superb execution were noted by the French as well. Mahan has described the three-week operation at St Kitt's as 'the most brilliant military effort of the whole war'  (Mahan, 470).
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> Rodney arrived at Barbados with twelve of the line to resume command on 19 February and Hood joined him. Both admirals were aware that de Grasse at Martinique was awaiting a convoy of troops and stores necessary for offensive operations. On 22 March the British squadron numbered thirty-six of the line, and because the French convoy escort was unlikely to number more than fourteen Hood was gratified when Rodney initially placed the fleet (to windward) athwart both the northern and southern approaches. But Rodney changed his mind and ordered a southern concentration. The French convoy, escorted by only three of the line, reached Fort Royal safely by the unguarded northern route. Hood was livid; only a 'madman' in command of the French squadron would have come 'in sight of St Lucia, knowing, as he must, the force of the British fleet, which would naturally be on the lookout'  (Letters, ed. Hannay, 97).
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> When de Grasse left Fort Royal for St Domingue with thirty-six of the line escorting a vast convoy of troops and trade, Rodney pursued. Hood's division was in the van, which became isolated on 9 April when the rest of the squadron lay becalmed in the lee of Dominica; the Barfleur received fire from five French ships for over an hour before support could come up. De Grasse, retreating towards Guadeloupe while shepherding battle-damaged ships, was brought to engagement near the Saints on 12 April with his fleet reduced to thirty against the British thirty-six. Hood's division, now placed in the rear because of the damage it had suffered, was in a position to emulate Rodney in breaking through the French line. But this left him becalmed in the lee of Dominica and only in late afternoon could he rejoin the action. By this time de Grasse in the shattered Ville de Paris (110 guns) was looking for a flag officer to whom to surrender with honour. Hood obliged, and after a brief but bloody ten minutes of fire from the Barfleur de Grasse struck. Five French ships were taken and the rest fled. Knowing the French were in disarray, Hood pleaded with Rodney to let him chase, but permission was not given until 17 April, upon which Hood hurried to the Mona Passage with ten of the line. It took only two days, but the French had got through one day before; still, he captured two of the line that came from Guadeloupe plus a frigate and a sloop. Yet all he could think about was the opportunity that had been lost-'a great fleet ... so completely beaten and routed and not pursued'. He vented his feelings in letters bemoaning the capriciousness of Rodney and the irresolution of Rodney's captain of the fleet, who was 'no more fit for the station he fills than I am to be an archbishop' (Letters, ed. Hannay, 136-7; Letters and Papers of ... Barham, 1.163). He was advised to tone his letters down, but declared he could not.
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> In June Hood supervised fleet repairs at Jamaica. In July Rodney was superseded by Admiral Hugh Pigot, inexperienced and sluggish but agreeable; Hood deluged him with advice, but they got along rather well. The hurricane season of 1782 was spent at New York. Hood, whose marriage was a happy one, wrote to Susannah that he would 'not let slip any opportunity' to return to her  (Hood, Admirals Hood, 81) and drafted a letter of resignation, but, finding that the king had sent out Prince William to serve under his care, knew he must stay on and threw 'the letter into the fire'  (Letters and Papers of ... Barham, 1.249). When Hood left New York on 22 November the Albemarle, commanded by young Captain Horatio Nelson, went with him, Nelson having asked Pigot to let him serve under Hood in the West Indies. Nelson was soon elated: 'He treats me as if I was his son'  (Dispatches and Letters, 1.72). Hood held semi-independent command off Jamaica (Pigot was at the Leeward Islands) and spent the rest of the war trying to intercept and bring to battle French and Spanish squadrons that had no wish to meet him.
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> Peace and war, 1783-1795
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> Hood returned to England in late June 1783. The warm relationship with Captain Nelson continued; after having him to dinner at his London house, 12 Wimpole Street, Hood declared that it was always open to him, and the oftener Nelson came the happier it would make him. In 1784 Hood helped Nelson obtain command of the Boreas, assigned to the West Indies. That same year, as a popular admiral (the City of London had presented him with its freedom in a gold box), he was nominated for Westminster, and though he had considered himself lucky to escape from an earlier attempt to nominate him, this time he could not refuse because Pitt the younger (and the king) truly needed him to oppose Charles James Fox. The election in May 1784 was notoriously marked by violence and fraudulent voting. Hood later described it as 'the most arduous and unpleasant business I ever took in hand'  (Rutland MSS, 3.134). He topped the poll but was not comfortable in parliament, and the expense of being in London exhausted his finances, for he had never set his sights on making a fortune in prize money. He requested a sinecure, which was denied, but was appointed commander-in-chief at Portsmouth during 1786-8 and again in 1791-3.
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> In September 1782 Hood had been given an Irish peerage as Baron Hood of Catherington. Certainly he deserved royal favour, not least because responsibility for Prince William was a difficult assignment. The father himself cautioned that 'it would not be proper he should be left to the sole guidance of his volatile imagination'  (Extracts, ed. Laughton, 1.228). When the time came for William to be captain of a ship Hood saw that Lieutenant Isaac Schomberg was placed on board as a 'minder'. At Antigua in 1787 a dispute erupted between the captain and his lieutenant over a petty matter and Schomberg demanded a court martial, which Nelson, then the commodore on station, unwisely granted. Thereafter Hood was unable to do anything for Nelson for five years, but he took the risk of offending Prince William by appointing Schomberg, 'a deserving officer with no prospect of promotion but by him', first lieutenant of his flagship. The prince was deeply wounded by this and wrote angry, censorious letters. Hood composed beautifully tactful replies, making clear, nevertheless, that he was unrepentant and judged Schomberg to be 'a very excellent officer, and a sensible well-behaved man'  (Ranft, 4.290-3). This mark of determination to support professional merit even under the most trying circumstances was noticed in the service.
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> Hood was not averse to the idea of going to sea again. He had been offered the East Indies command in 1784, but refused it. As he confided to Prince William,
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> I should run a great risque of losing that character, which has cost me forty years labour to obtain, and besides, had I lived, I must have returned poorer than I went out, unless I did one of two things, either connive at trade in the Kings ships, or plunder government by contracts, neither of which I could bring myself to do. (NMM, HOO/2, 2 Aug 1784)
> Yet he strongly defended Warren Hastings in a parliamentary speech that stressed how dangerous a restraint would be placed upon persons in 'stations abroad of high difficulty' if fear of impeachment hung over them  (Brooke, 2.637). Too many of his speeches, however, were thought indiscreet, a factor that evidently prevented his being appointed first lord upon the retirement of Lord Howe. Instead Pitt asked him to take a seat on the board so that Lord Chatham 'should have the best Professional assistance'  (NMM, HOO/2, 21 June 1788). Thus, from 1788 to 1795, he served on the Admiralty board; nevertheless, when war came in February 1793 he was appointed commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. He left Portsmouth on 22 May in the Victory with a talented group of proteges, among whom was Horatio Nelson.
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> The Mediterranean command had always required strategic and diplomatic wisdom. Supremacy was to be exerted over a broad expanse while simultaneously keeping the French fleet at Toulon in check. At this time the only British base was Gibraltar, so the navy's operational viability greatly depended upon diplomacy. Hood was soon complaining that he was almost blind from writing to so many ministers and other correspondents.
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> Quickly, however, the situation became highly unusual. Hood had scarcely arrived off Toulon when he was approached by envoys from Marseilles and the naval base at Toulon, fearfully seeking his protection from the ruthless Jacobin army sent south from Paris. Their rather amazing offer was to place the Toulon forts and fleet in British hands in trust, to be restored after the war. Hood accepted on condition that the French declare for constitutional monarchy as the price of his assistance, a stance not formally adopted by the British government. Yet Hood had had to act quickly, and as Nelson commented, he had secured a strongly fortified port and twenty-two sail of the line without firing a shot. Pitt publicly hailed the event, but the opportunity had come too early, before British troops could be made available. Having only 1500 to land, Hood had to scrape together what foreign troops he could and hope to hang on until help arrived. Sir Gilbert Elliot came out to assist him politically and administratively; assistance that was welcome, the variety of tasks being well beyond the powers of one man. Yet Hood, though almost seventy, displayed vigour and alertness; Nelson commented that 'he possesses the mind of forty years of age'  (Dispatches and Letters, 1.378).
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> However, Hood proved too vigorous, devoting much of his naval force to carrying out manifold tasks all over the Mediterranean according to his original orders. The unfortunate consequence was that when the French launched a major attack on Toulon in December he had only a third of his fleet present to resist it and to remove the French warships and refugee royalists when resistance crumbled. Moreover his excessive optimism led to hanging on too long in hopes of military relief. He ignored the urgings of both his own and the Spanish government to begin preparations for taking the French warships out of harbour. In consequence the final evacuation on 17 December was hastily improvised: only three French battleships were removed, and attempts to burn the rest were botched, with only nine of the line, three frigates, and two sloops being destroyed.
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> None the less, it was a prodigious naval victory. The French lost a total of thirteen of the line and the Toulon arsenal was ravaged. Hood refused to be discouraged. After carrying the refugees to Italian ports he mounted an expedition to occupy Corsica as a base. Frustrated by the caution of the generals, he intervened in their business. On this occasion Hood's positive thinking yielded success. Assaults from the sea mounted by his marines (they were actually soldiers assigned to the fleet as marines), assisted by a blockade and Pasquale Paoli's independence movement, helped the army complete the conquest, which was sealed by the French garrison's surrender (4500 men) on 22 May 1794. But the army commanders, two of whom resigned in protest, did not hide their resentment of his imperious direction and sometimes ill-informed criticism.
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> Hood went home in early November 1794, intending to return the next spring. In recognition of his services he was made an elder brother of Trinity House, his wife was given a British peerage as Baroness Hood of Catherington, and on 4 April 1795 he was promoted admiral of the blue. He did not return to the Mediterranean because when he insisted, going over the first lord's head, that the number of ships assigned to him by the Admiralty was seriously inadequate, Earl Spencer, seeing a threat to naval discipline, got him dismissed from the command. This ended Hood's naval career. In 1796 he was appointed governor of Greenwich Hospital, and, on vacating his Westminster seat at the general election, he was elevated to Viscount Hood of Whitley in the British peerage.
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> The man and his profession
> 
> Deeply regretting the loss of Hood to the service in 1795, Horatio Nelson remarked that he was 'the best Officer, take him altogether, that England has to boast of, ... equally great in all situations which an Admiral can be placed in'  (Dispatches and Letters, 2.146). Few naval officers at that moment in time would have disagreed with this assessment. Although before 1781 Hood had had no experience of fleet command, he rapidly identified the countless things conducive to success, things that required professional knowledge and imagination, clarity of communication (Hood could write as well as speak clearly), forethought, attention to detail, and vigilant monitoring. Some men's minds, he wrote in 1782, 'are full of anxiety, impatience, and apprehension, while others, under similar circumstances, are perfectly cool, tranquil, and indifferent. Mine is of the former cast'  (Letters, ed. Hannay, 145). Naturally he set a high standard for himself and despised indolence or negligence in others whether superiors or subordinates. One is not surprised to hear that he inspired awe. As his former secretary wrote in 1799, he displayed 'the sternness of the old school ..., but then, the whole is tempered by a tenderness and urbanity, that prevents its ever being oppressive, or tyrannical'  (Naval Chronicle, 2.45).
> 
> Hood's leadership of a fleet in battle was never fully tested, either because he was second in command or, later, because opposing squadrons were intent on keeping their distance. Instead, he should be remembered as a consummate naval strategist. Gathering information was a fundamental duty; a commander who did not take steps to discover what he needed to know could 'do nothing but from the chapter of accidents'  (Letters and Papers of ... Barham, 1.205). Hood's active mind weighed intelligence reports, worried through the possibilities, and produced reasoned appreciations. He was uncannily accurate in forecasting French moves in the Caribbean in 1781-3, often to an unreceptive superior. Working through his anxieties and apprehensions to a reasoned plan, he was then strongly disposed to act, and one may easily detect in him a perpetual offensive spirit, one of his most striking attributes. It was also, however, principled: as he commented to Digby after asking for the four battleships, he wished to be on the offensive; on the defensive he could not 'prevent mischief'  (TNA: PRO, ADM 1/313, 2 Nov 1781). This offensive spirit he carried to excess during the Toulon occupation, but Hood's inability to exercise it as second in command in 1781-2 was unfortunate.
> 
> Some historians have been disgusted by the relentless stream of advice and criticism appearing in Hood's letters. Although most of the advice was issued beforehand and most of the criticism was provoked by advice not taken, it still seems, at least to the modern eye, excessive and insubordinate. At one point he admitted that he had 'probably gone too far in hints ... thrown out' to Admiral Pigot  (Letters, ed. Hannay, 140). At times he certainly went too far when his criticisms touched elements of personal character, as they frequently did in the case of Rodney. Some of this amounted to backbiting but most of it was in the open and may be characterized as effrontery (when asked to tone down his letters he remarked that it would be pointless because his views were known throughout the fleet). He was so often guilty of the crime of being right that the king's personal regard may have played a role in saving him from the usual hierarchical consequences.
> 
> On the other hand, there is no evidence that 'the fleet' disagreed with his criticisms or thought that he should have suppressed them, and it should be recalled that Hood's relations with his chiefs were not, except in the case of Graves, disruptive. Rodney exhausted the patience of many who had to work with him and his temperament was as unlike Hood's as can be imagined, but Hood recognized Rodney's merit as a combat leader. He remarked to Sir Charles Middleton that if Rodney had been in command at the Chesapeake 'the 5th of September would I think have been a most glorious day for Great Britain'  (Letters and Papers of ... Barham, 1.125). At the time he wrote this he had recently experienced four months of Sir George in other respects, at his worst. But there was never a breach; in fact there was co-operation, and considering their differences of temperament this was a commendable achievement for both admirals, less common in that century than is sometimes supposed. Hood also worked well with Pigot and Digby. But he did not mend relations with Graves, and Rodney kept them apart. In the end, one should remember that the ablest of Hood's naval contemporaries judged him by his actions.
> 
> They also admired his deep respect for the profession. Fellow officers realized that he was not pure. He helped his relatives to promotions-they all did-and accepted the role of patronage. On the other hand, he was confident that performance would always earn approbation and respect, 'for no commanding officer, however overbearing he may be, dare take any liberty with an inferior who does his duty like an officer and a gentleman'  (Hotham, 1.32). As for politics, Hood was not really averse, despite his discomfort with the hurly-burly of electioneering at Westminster. He proclaimed that he was not 'a party man'; if so perceived, he said, 'I must ... expect to lose every consideration in the line of my profession'  (Letters, ed. Hannay, 155-6). His loyalty to the regime during the American war and thereafter to the younger Pitt manifested a strong disposition to support the government in power and avoid partisanship. This disposition seems to have enabled Keppel, when first lord in 1782, to re-establish good relations with the Hood brothers. Finally, there was the matter of prize money, to which Samuel Hood was relatively indifferent. He did not become rich in the service-unusual for an admiral active in wartime. He therefore felt that he needed (and deserved) a public pension to enable him to support his peerage, because, as he informed Pitt in 1798, 'the greatest part of my income arises from the governorship I hold; and when I drop, Lady Hood, possessing every shilling I am worth, will not have more than £800 a year to maintain her'  (TNA: PRO, PRO 30/8/146, fols. 27-8). The pension was awarded in 1800.
> 
> Throughout retirement Hood's mind remained active; he seldom gave way to bitterness, though a great blow fell when Susannah died on 25 May 1806, in the apartments at Greenwich. Hood wrote: 'A better woman, a better mother, or better wife never existed'  (GEC, Peerage, 6.569). His health problems, so much heard about earlier, were remarkably minor; at eighty-five he still rode every day and had 'no complaint but deafness'  (Diaries of Sylvester Douglas, 2.34). He died at 5 Queen's Square, Bath, on 27 January 1816 after suffering a fall. Upon feeling weak and retiring to lie down, he made a last accurate forecast: the accident, he remarked, would be the 'finishing blow'.
> 
> The viscountcy passed to his third and only surviving son, Henry (1753-1836), whose marriage to Jane Wheler of Whitley Abbey had brought Warwickshire lands to the family. Hood was buried next to his wife at Greenwich Hospital. Among distinguished admirals of the eighteenth century he is almost unique in that no monument has been erected to his memory, but there can hardly be a more impressive one than beautiful Mount Hood in Oregon, sighted and named in October 1792 by a lieutenant with George Vancouver's expedition. Worldwide Hood is remembered for the majestic battle cruiser that carried his name; inadequately armoured and penetrated by a German salvo, she blew up and sank in May 1941.
> 
> Daniel A. Baugh 
> 
> Michael Duffy 
> 
> Sources  M. Duffy, 'Samuel Hood, first Viscount Hood, 1724-1816', Precursors of Nelson: British admirals of the eighteenth century, ed. P. Le Fevre and R. Harding (2000) + D. A. Baugh, 'Sir Samuel Hood: superior subordinate', George Washington's opponents: British generals and admirals in the American revolution, ed. G. A. Billias (1969) + D. Hood, The Admirals Hood (1942) + Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3, ed. D. Hannay, Navy RS (1895) + Letters and papers of Charles, Lord Barham, ed. J. K. Laughton, 3 vols., Navy RS, 32, 38-9 (1907-11) + J. Holland Rose, Lord Hood and the defence of Toulon (1922) + M. Wyndham, Chronicles of the eighteenth century, 2 vols. (1924), vol. 2 + The private papers of John, earl of Sandwich, ed. G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen, 4 vols., Navy RS, 69, 71, 75, 78 (1932-8) + K. Breen, 'Graves and Hood at the Chesapeake', Mariner's Mirror, 66 (1980), 53-64 + J. A. Sulivan, 'Graves and Hood', Mariner's Mirror, 69 (1983), 175-94 + GEC, Peerage, 6.568-70 + DNB + flag officers' letters, North America, 1767-72, TNA: PRO, ADM 1/483 + captains' letters, 1774-8, TNA: PRO, ADM 1/1898-1904 + flag officers' letters, Leeward Islands, 1780-87, TNA: PRO, ADM 1/313 + J. Creswell, British admirals of the eighteenth century: tactics in battle (1972) + D. Syrett, The Royal Navy in American waters, 1775-1783 (1989) + A. T. Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783, 12th edn (1918) + B. McL. Ranft, ed., 'Prince William and Lieutenant Schomberg, 1787-1788', The naval miscellany, 4, Navy RS, 92 (1952), 270-93 + 'Biographical memoirs of the Right Honourable Samuel Viscount Hood', The Naval Chronicle, 2 (July-Dec 1799), 1-50 + The dispatches and letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, ed. N. H. Nicolas, 7 vols. (1844-6) + NMM, HOO/2, 20 May, 2 Aug 1784, 21 June 1788 + 'Extracts from the papers of Samuel, first Viscount Hood', ed. J. K. Laughton, The naval miscellany, 1, Navy RS (1892), 221-58 + J. Brooke, 'Hood, Samuel', HoP, Commons, 1754-90 + Pages and portraits from the past: being the private papers of Sir William Hotham, ed. A. M. W. Stirling, 2 vols. (1919) + The diaries of Sylvester Douglas, ed. F. Bickley, 2 vols. (1928) + N. W. Surry and J. H. Thomas, eds., Book of original entries, 1731-51, Portsmouth Record Series, 3 (1976) + The manuscripts of his grace the duke of Rutland, 4 vols., HMC, 24 (1888-1905)
> Archives BL, signal book, Add. MS 47467 + CAC Cam., corresp. and papers + NMM, corresp. and papers + Wilts. & Swindon HC, letters | BL, letters to Lord Bridport, Add. MSS 35193-35202, passim + BL, letters to Francis Drake, Add. MS 46825 + BL, letters to George Jackson, Add. MS 9343 + BL, corresp. with Lord Nelson, Add. MSS 34902-34937, passim + CBS, corresp. with Scrope Bernard + Devon RO, corresp. with first Viscount Sidmouth + Glos. RO, letters to Francis Reynolds + NL Scot., corresp. with Robert Liston + NMM, letters to William Hamilton + NMM, letters to Samuel Hood + NMM, letters to Charles Middleton + NMM, letters to Lord Sandwich + NMM, letters to Charles Yorke + corresp. with F. J. Jackson, FO353 + letters to William Pitt and second earl of Chatham, PRO 36/8 + corresp. with Lord Rodney, boxes 12, 26
> Likenesses  J. Wollaston, oils, 1746, NMM · J. Reynolds, oils, 1783, Man. City Gall. · J. K. Sherwin, line engraving, pubd 1783 (after T. Gainsborough), NPG · J. Northcote, oils, 1784, NMM [see illus.] · L. F. Abbott, oils, 1794-5, NMM; version, NPG · Abbott, print, repro. in Hood, Admirals Hood, facing p. 112 · T. Gainsborough, oils, Ironmongers' Hall, London · K. A. Hickel, group portrait, oils (The House of Commons, 1793), NPG · J. C. Lochee, Wedgwood medallion, Wedgwood Museum, Stoke on Trent · J. Northcote, oils, the Admiralty, Portsmouth · J. Tassie, paste medallion, Scot. NPG · B. West, portrait, priv. coll.; repro. in Hood, Admirals Hood, facing p. 24
> Wealth at death  pension of £2000 p.a. from 1800
> 
> 
> 
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