[BITList] QF- A380 Singapore....four reports

Mon Nov 29 08:29:05 GMT 2010

Begin forwarded message:

I like Qantas – These guys  knew what to do in an emergency.

Hi Chaps, 
        I received these from some friends re the engine failure in VH-OQA ex Singapore . . .

No 1:

aa5.jpg 

qantas_a388_vh-oqa_singapore_101104_7.jpg 

A380T900-07.jpg 

The disk has separated into a classic hoop failure comprising 3 or more pieces. 

The piece in the photo measures at about 133 degrees using the planar radii at the rim extended to the center, well within experience for typical tri hub burst. 

Scribing circles shows little visual circumferential distortion of the rim or bore indicating rapid burst. 

The fracture surface at the right side of the picture indicates planar propagation from the rim to the bore with a transition to tensile overload near the bore. 

The fracture surface at the left edge of the picture indicates hoop overload at the bore and planar propagation at the rim. 

Due to the sudden change in direction of the fracture surface upper-web it is likely that this fracture surface is secondary and that the direction of this fracture is bore to rim. 

Both the planar fracture surfaces terminate or emanate at disk slot bottoms. 

The upper surface of the disk bore exhibits tensile overload where the bore tore away from the shaft.

How successful do you estimate their chance of actually making a positive determination of probable cause?

Very high.

It seems that they have the primary fracture surface on this piece. This is extremely valuable. It is usual that the surface is heavily damaged or at least smeared at the origin. After visual and SEM analysis, which may be able to characterize the type and rate of propagation depending on surface condition, the fracture will be sectioned away from the surface allowing verification of material properties very near the origin. When this work is completed there will be only a small number of unknowns and other evidence will assist in narrowing the root cause tree.

It will be possible quite quickly to design an effective control plan based on this evidence. This could range from soft time inspections, to fixed interval inspections, to a changed hard time LLP life limit, or combination. Such control plans will automatically attract ADs due to the nature of the failure consequence.

Almost regardless of the actual root cause, subsequent corrective action will take longer just because of the cycle time to design, certify, manufacture and retrofit a change, if appropriate.

No 2:
Here are a couiple of pics of debris recovered on the ground on the Indonesian island:

No 3:
Here are just SOME of the problems Richard had in
Singapore last week aboard QF32.... I won't bother mentioning the engine
explosion!.... oops...mentioned the engine explosion, sorry.....

        *  massive fuel leak in the left mid fuel tank (the beast has 11 tanks,
including in the horizontal stabilizer on the tail)
        *  massive fuel leak in the left inner fuel tank
        *  a
hole on the flap canoe/fairing that you could fit your upper body
through
        *  the aft gallery in the fuel system failed, preventing many fuel transfer
functions
        *  fuel jettison had problems due to the previous problem above
        *  bloody great hole in the upper wing surface
        *  partial failure of leading edge slats
        *  partial failure of speed brakes/ground
spoilers      
        *  shrapnel damage to the flaps
        *  TOTAL loss of all hydraulic fluid in the Green System (beast has 2 x
5,000 PSI systems, Green and Yellow)
        *  manual extension of landing gear
        *  loss of 1 generator and associated systems
        *  loss of brake anti-skid system
        *  unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using normal method after landing
due to major damage to
systems       
        *  unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using using the fire switch!!!!!!!!
Therefore, no fire protection was available for that engine after the
explosion in #2
        *  ECAM warnings about major fuel imbalance because of fuel leaks on left
side, that were UNABLE to be fixed with cross-feeding 
        *  fuel trapped in Trim Tank (in the tail).  Therefore, possible major
C of G out-of-balance condition for landing.  Yikes!
        *  and much more to come..........

Richard was in the left seat, F/O in the right, S/O in the 2nd obs seat
right rear, also with his own Radio Management Panel, so he probably did
most of the coordination with the ground, Capt Dave Evans in the 1st obs
seat (middle).  He is a Check & Training Captain who was
training Harry Wubbin to be one also.  Harry was in the 3rd obs seat
(left rear). 

All 5 guys were FLAT OUT, especially the F/O who would have been
processing complicated 'ECAM' messages and procedures that were seemingly
never-ending!

I sent this to Pete, thus:

And he replied:
(No 4:)

I had some drinks yesterday with the F/O (Matt Hicks), S/O (Mark Johnson) and Training Captain under training (Harry Wubbin).

Harry was actually in the middle seat I think with Dave Evens in the third observers spot. Mind you within a few seconds it sounds like all the guys in the back were up and looking closely at what was going on (the view from the corners is not very good).

That list looks about right from what I've heard but they also had no auto thrust, engines 1 and 4 in degraded mode and for some reason the ECAM called for some of the yellow system hydraulic pumps associated with the number 4 engine to be turned off. It took 50 minutes to work through the ECAMs before they could get to the Status stage where the checklists are done and you can think about the state of play. Apparently at one point in the process the ECAM called for a Fuel Quantity Management System reset which, after being completed, threw up all the fuel problem checklists again even though they'd been dealt with already. They went through them much more quickly the second time but it sounded like it was getting depressing that it felt like it would never end.

Approach speed was around 165 knots and they got a "SPEED SPEED" auto call at one point. At the end of the landing roll there was a big sigh of relief until they were told that fuel was gushing out of the wing and heading towards the brakes which were indicating 900 degrees. Then it was adrenalin back on again. Once given the go ahead, the firies laid down foam and got that under control. Engine 1 was still going when the crew left. Apparently it took two fire trucks flooding the engine with foam to stop it.

This will be a good investigation.

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