[BITList] Father of the RAF
John Feltham
wulguru.wantok at gmail.com
Wed Feb 10 07:58:15 GMT 2010
visit http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/lotw/2010-02-10
Trenchard, Hugh Montague, first Viscount Trenchard (1873-1956), air
force officer, was born at Windsor Lodge, Haines Hill, Taunton,
Somerset, on 3 February 1873, the second son and third of six children
of Henry Montague Trenchard (1838-1914), solicitor, and his wife,
Georgina Louisa Catherine Tower, daughter of Captain John McDowall
Skene RN. Many struggling junior officers have been consoled since
1918 by widespread knowledge of two facts: 'the father of the Royal
Air Force' found examinations almost impossible to pass, and he did
not even begin to become famous until he was well past forty. He was
flatly rejected by both Dartmouth and Woolwich, and only just scraped
a pass-at the third attempt-in a far less demanding test for militia
candidates: these 'last resorts' were placed in whichever regiment
would accept them. His difficulties owed much to inept teaching at
both navy and army 'crammer' schools, and much to idleness (except at
games and riding), but also owed something to the sudden shock of
learning, at the vulnerable age of sixteen, that his father's practice
had failed. Bankruptcy was a public disgrace hard to bear for a
particularly proud member of an old-established family. He was
dismayed, rather than inspired, by the knowledge that he owed the rest
of his education to the charity of wiser and richer relatives.
Trenchard was granted a commission in September 1893 as a second
lieutenant in the 2nd battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, and posted to
join his regiment in India. An inarticulate, prickly young man,
socially inept and without money, he was known as 'the Camel' (did not
drink, could not speak), and was far from popular until he revealed a
rare combination of talents. He mastered any horse assigned to him;
played polo skilfully (fending off Winston Churchill vigorously);
traded horses profitably; picked winners regularly; shot accurately;
and-not least-organized teams and tournaments efficiently. As his
confidence grew, he began to read voraciously in a determined attempt
to educate himself, but he never learned to spell or write with any
fluency.
A dashing cavalry officer
On the outbreak of the South African War in October 1899 Trenchard was
sent to South Africa. Promoted to captain in February 1900, he was
told to raise and train a mounted company which brought together a
bunch of boisterous, aggressive horsemen, many of them Australian. He
had the makings of a fine guerrilla leader until his impetuosity led
him into an ambush at Dwarsvlei in western Transvaal in October 1900,
where he was severely wounded in the chest and spine, and invalided
home to England in December. Although his left lung was permanently
damaged, he made a remarkable recovery, thanks to a strong
constitution and a self-imposed regime of strenuous winter sports in
Switzerland, where a heavy fall shook his spine back into place,
enabling him to walk freely once more. He returned to South Africa at
his own insistence in May 1901 to resume his career as a dashing
cavalry officer, fearless in combat, impatient of all orders but his
own, and respectful only to those seniors whom he admired. He was full
of high Victorian bravado, and his blunt words, boundless energy, and
stern discipline of men under his command commended him to Field
Marshal Lord Kitchener.
While on leave in England at the end of the war Trenchard accepted an
appointment in October 1903 as assistant commandant of the South
Nigeria regiment, first as major, then as lieutenant-colonel. He
relished the opportunity to lead his own force of irregular cavalry on
expeditions against 'unpacified' tribes in the interior, but he also
supervised surveys, road building, and drainage projects, and enhanced
his reputation as a man of formidable personality who never hesitated
to criticize all and sundry in the bluntest terms. Those few who had
the courage to answer back were, of course, the men he subsequently
valued. In 1906 he was made a member of the Distinguished Service
Order, and appointed to command his regiment in 1908. But he fell
seriously ill in 1910 and was again invalided home. On recovering, he
rejoined his original regiment, dropped in rank to major, and served
in Ulster until 1912.
An indifferent pilot and dangerous tutor
By 1912 Trenchard was rising forty, unmarried, and discontented. He
was respected by good officers and men, but too 'unclubbable' (and too
poor) for high rank. After almost twenty years of strenuous military
service, he was looking about for new opportunities, in or out of
uniform, and his colleagues-wary of his sharp tongue-were more than
willing to help him. One of his few friends advised him to learn to
fly and he agreed to give it a go. He was promptly granted three
months' leave, and boldly spent the considerable sum of £75 on flying
lessons at the Sopwith school, Brooklands. After only two weeks of
tuition, including no more than sixty-four minutes in the air, he was
granted a pilot's certificate (no. 270) by the Royal Aero Club on 31
July 1912.
The Royal Flying Corps having been formed in May 1912, Trenchard was
immediately seconded to it and sent to the Central Flying School at
Upavon in Wiltshire, where he met Churchill again (an even worse
pilot). Instead of taking a pupil's course-essential if he were to
acquire flying skills himself, let alone transmit them to others-his
age and military experience saw him appointed to the staff. As
assistant commandant, in the rank of lieutenant-colonel, his capacity
for effective organization and exacting unquestioned obedience to
orders proved of great value to a newly formed school that attracted
many would-be free spirits. It was now that his mighty foghorn voice
earned him, for the rest of his life, the nickname Boom. Although an
indifferent pilot and dangerous tutor, he recognized more quickly than
most officers of his age the aeroplane's unlimited military potential.
Constant aggression
When war broke out in August 1914 Trenchard took command of
Farnborough, Hampshire, where he allegedly found 'one typewriter, a
confidential box with a pair of boots in it, and a lot of unpaid
bills'. From these small beginnings he began to build an organization
capable of supporting a rapidly expanding number of squadrons. As
early as November, however, he had escaped from the rear to the front,
as an operational commander, and in January 1915 he met General Sir
Douglas Haig, who took command of all British forces on the western
front from December. Trenchard came to admire Haig without reserve;
for his part, Haig declared in 1922 that the First World War had
produced only two new things of importance: 'barbed wire and
Trenchard' (Boyle, 506).
From 1915 onwards Trenchard pressed hard for the development and
quantity production of aircraft of improved design, with more powerful
engines and armament, equipped with reliable wireless sets and
cameras, and a gadget to permit the accurate dropping of bigger and
better-designed bombs. But his main concern, formulated during 1915,
was to develop an unflinching spirit of constant aggression among
pilots and observers. An opinion that would become an unshakeable
doctrine was already forming in his mind. Persistent attack achieved
air supremacy, and that supremacy (given aircraft sufficient in
quantity and quality) would permit devastating attack upon enemy
industrial centres and lines of communication to the fighting fronts.
'The aeroplane', he famously (and mistakenly) asserted 'is not a
defence against the aeroplane'. And the use of parachutes, which could
have been as readily available for British as well as German airmen by
1918, was forbidden because they might undermine that spirit of
aggression. That ruling, made by non-flying members of the air board,
was firmly supported by Trenchard.
In August 1915 Trenchard succeeded Sir David Henderson as head of the
Royal Flying Corps in France, with the warm approval of both Haig and
Kitchener (secretary of state for war) and was promoted to brigadier-
general. From Henderson he inherited Maurice Baring-author, linguist,
diplomat-as an essential assistant, who translated his incoherent
mutterings into fluent prose. 'I can't write what I mean, I can't say
what I mean, but I expect you to know what I mean' (Hyde, 57). More
poetically, Baring saw his task as 'bottling a mountain torrent while
yet preserving the tingling fury of its natural state' (Letley, 174).
They visited all squadrons and depots, listened to countless
complaints and suggestions, noticed everything, no matter how
carefully concealed, and whenever Trenchard's tactless, overbearing
manner caused more than usual offence, Baring poured the necessary oil
and subtly rebuked his master. His fluent French also made it possible
for Trenchard to establish good relations with the French air service.
He did it so well that Marshal Foch described him as an incomparable
staff officer.
During 1915, however, the Germans produced a Fokker monoplane equipped
with a machine-gun that fired safely through the propeller arc and
forced Trenchard's technically inferior aircraft onto the defensive.
They became 'Fokker fodder' and it was said in parliament that 'our
pilots are being murdered rather than killed' (Lee, 214). Until
better machines arrived in service early in 1916, he was reluctantly
obliged to accept fewer and shorter reconnaissance patrols, and was
unable to foster that continuous co-operation between artillery and
aircraft (via wireless and photographs) that he and Haig foresaw as
the key to accurate hitting of enemy targets. Although British and
German machines were evenly matched in quality from 1916 onwards, and
the British increasingly outnumbered their opponents, they suffered
four times as many casualties as a result of Trenchard's policy of
constant offensive. 'To him, as to his staff, and most of his senior
commanders', wrote A. S. G. Lee, an able pilot who survived long
enough to become experienced, 'for a British aeroplane to be one mile
across the trenches was offensive: for it to be ten miles over was
more offensive'. What really mattered, however, was not the aircraft's
position in the sky but the calibre of its pilot and the quality of
his machine. 'The most rashly aggressive pigeon won't get far with a
hawk' (Lee, 217-18).
Creation of a new service
In England, meanwhile, intense competition between the War Office and
the Admiralty for recruits (air and ground), training facilities,
factory space, designers, and producers of airframes and aero-engines
was harming the war effort. In December 1916, for example, the Royal
Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service placed orders for seventy-
six varieties of aircraft and fifty-seven of engines (Johns, 10-11).
Both air arms were weaker than they should have been, and neither gave
serious attention to home defence against aerial attack. Several
alarmingly successful daylight raids by German bombers during June and
July 1917 revealed the inadequacy of this defence and fuelled powerful
demands for a united service, with its own ministry, independent of
army or navy control, to make efficient use of aviation resources and
frame an effective home defence. General Jan Christian Smuts (South
African member of the imperial war cabinet) and Henderson, backed by
the prime minister, Lloyd George, were largely responsible for the
creation of this independent air service in April 1918. Trenchard
agreed with the reformers, but thought it best to struggle on with an
unsatisfactory situation until the war ended. He thus had good reason
for disliking the title 'father of the Royal Air Force', so often
accorded him in later years. If that service had not been created by
the heat of battle out of fear of defeat, it would never have emerged
out of the chill of calculation when the war to end all war had been
won. On the other hand, although he did not father the infant, he
certainly deserves credit for protecting it from predators until it
was sturdy enough to thrive without anyone's help.
Despite Haig's protests and his own reluctance, Trenchard was
appointed chief of the air staff, the first head of the new service,
and returned to England in January 1918; he was also knighted (KCB).
But the first air minister was Lord Rothermere, younger brother of
Lord Northcliffe. These influential newspaper owners, backed by Lloyd
George, were vehement opponents of Haig and hoped to procure his
dismissal. At that time, Trenchard lacked the political skills,
contacts, and even the resolution to counter such men. He simply
resigned (bringing Rothermere down with him, to his surprise) in April
and sulked for a month. While sitting on a bench in Green Park on 8
May he overheard two naval officers discussing his conduct. 'It's an
outrage', said one. 'I don't know why the government should pander to
a man who threw in his hand at the height of a battle. If I'd my way
with Trenchard I'd have him shot.' Somewhat chastened, he reluctantly
agreed to return to France later that month as head of a small force
intended to bomb targets in Germany. Neither John Salmond (his
successor as head of the RAF in France) nor the French (who feared
reprisals, and thought all resources should be devoted to the
battlefield) co-operated willingly. 'A more gigantic waste of effort
and personnel there has never been in any war', declared Trenchard in
November 1918 (Hyde, 44). Nevertheless, the few raids that were
mounted convinced him that, in any future war with Germany, a
systematic campaign of heavy bombing would shatter the morale of its
people. Ignoring evidence to the contrary, he was equally convinced
that German bombing would not dismay Britons.
A legendary decade
Trenchard was created a baronet in October 1919 and received a
handsome cash grant of £10,000. Winston Churchill, minister of war and
air, pressed him to resume his post as chief of the air staff, which
he did on 15 May, and during the next decade he became a legend. He
clearly understood that his new service must be reduced to a shadow of
its former strength, and remain small and weak for the foreseeable
future, but it could be provided with sound foundations upon which to
build a powerful air force, should the need ever arise. A realistic
memorandum of September 1919 (converted into a government white paper
in December) set out an affordable framework for a service of under
30,000 officers and men. He founded an apprentice school (at Halton,
Buckinghamshire) for youths aged fifteen to eighteen who became ground
crews, a cadet college (at Cranwell, Lincolnshire) for career
officers, and a staff college (at Andover, Hampshire) for future
leaders. He set up squadrons at Oxford and Cambridge, introduced short-
service commissions and a network of auxiliary squadrons-rightly
believing that many high-spirited young men were eager to spend some
exciting years in cockpits, but were not interested in a subsequent,
poorly paid career behind desks.
Trenchard also learned to fight in the Whitehall jungle, with
Churchill's intermittent support, against persistent attempts by both
the War Office and the Admiralty to divide the RAF between them and
end its independent existence. He found in 'air policing' of Britain's
empire throughout the Middle East, but especially in Mesopotamia
(Iraq), an ideal opportunity to demonstrate that the RAF was both
effective and cheap. 'Control without occupation' Sir Samuel Hoare,
secretary of state for air in the 1920s, called it (Hoare, 265): an
irresistible combination for politicians acutely conscious of
Britain's financial weakness. A handful of squadrons, equipped with
biplanes left over from the war, armed with light machine-guns and
small bombs, and supported only by a small number of armoured cars
(converted or built out of the RAF's own meagre budget) were usually
able to impose a local peace or separate rivals more swiftly and
cheaply than large, expensive garrisons of slow-moving soldiers.
Trenchard encouraged annual air displays at Hendon, which proved
enormously popular, and also fostered the gradual development of air
routes which might one day link every part of the empire. At the end
of 1923 he was accepted as a member of the chiefs of staff committee-
formally equal to the heads of the navy and the army. In 1925 he
argued in favour of making the RAF (rather than the Royal Navy,
assisted by a garrison of soldiers) primarily responsible for the
defence of Singapore. Even before the fall of that base to Japanese
attack in 1942 he regarded his failure to win that argument as the low
point of his career.
Unfortunately, the success of air policing seduced Trenchard and his
successors into ignoring the need to prepare for possible conflict
with nations as technically advanced as Britain. The RAF failed to
make adequate progress before 1939 in precisely those fields which the
offensive doctrine most required: accurate navigation, in daylight or
darkness, in large, properly heated and fully armed aircraft capable
of carrying heavy loads of efficient bombs (high explosive or
incendiary) a long way and dropping them accurately on well-chosen
targets. In 1925, however, Trenchard had been impressed by the Fairey
Fox, a two-seat, single-engine biplane day-bomber, equipped with an
American Curtiss D-12 engine. The Fox outclassed all other British
machines of that time, and Trenchard immediately ordered enough to
equip a single squadron. Objections-from industry and politicians-to
the use of a foreign engine prevented him from ordering more, but the
Fox example did encourage a gradual improvement. In the late 1920s,
the RAF's success in Schneider trophy races confirmed the high popular
regard first earned at Hendon.
Morale was high, thanks partly to team spirit generated by army and
navy opposition, partly also to Trenchard's creation in 1919 of a
benevolent fund (which has spent millions of pounds since that date
relieving distress among servicemen and their families), but mostly to
a widespread conviction that aircraft would play a vital part in any
future war. That part, according to Trenchard's doctrine, would be
primarily as an offensive bomber force, hitting targets of 'strategic'
importance, rather than as a defensive fighter force, successfully
resisting attempts by enemy bombers to hit British targets. Little
attention was paid to co-operation with either the army or the navy,
or to practising realistic aerial combat, or to the creation of a
fleet of adequate transport aircraft. The doctrine was carefully
articulated, confidently asserted, but insufficiently tested, in
theory or practice, during (or for long after) Trenchard's term of
office.
Trenchard closely supervised the composition of a detailed account of
the air war which reflected his own opinions and evaded all
controversial issues. Sir Walter Raleigh, Merton professor of English
literature at Oxford, wrote the first volume, but he died in 1922, and
H. A. Jones, a civil servant who had been Raleigh's chief research
assistant, completed the task. Trenchard had offered it first to
Baring and then to T. E. Lawrence. Baring wrote an entertaining survey
of their wartime partnership, published in 1920, but Trenchard
insisted on removing most references to himself, convincing the author
that it would be impossible for him to attempt a serious, independent
history of the air service. As for Lawrence, although he greatly
admired Trenchard, he had the confidence, personal contacts, and
intellectual energy to explore those issues-strategy, tactics,
equipment, training, inter-service quarrels, political interference,
and so on-and make up his own mind about them. Sadly, he too turned it
down. Jones left a valuable record; Lawrence might have produced a
great one. Instead, we have only The Mint, Lawrence's account of
recruit life in the early 1920s, which is as vivid and controversial
as everything else he wrote.
Trenchard was knighted again (GCB) in January 1924 and became the
first marshal of the RAF (equivalent to five-star rank) in 1927. He
retired on 31 December 1929 and was made a baron next day. 'You are
too big to be the father of a grown-up child', wrote Lawrence on 18
December. 'Let the beast go and make his own mistakes. It's going to
be a very splendid service, and will always be proud of you' (Hyde,
233).
Police reformer
Trenchard was appointed a director of the Goodyear Tyre and Rubber
Company early in 1930 and later a director of Rhodesian Railways. In
March 1931 the prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, invited him to
succeed Lord Byng as commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Morale
was held to be low throughout the force, and its organization was
clearly in need of reform. He was unwilling to take on a difficult and
thankless task, but did so from November, in response to a personal
appeal from George V. He had the support of Sir John Anderson,
permanent head of the Home Office, and Maurice Drummond, who took on
Baring's role as interpreter and writer.
Trenchard made two conditions, revealing his attitude to the new job.
One was that he be released at once if his 'life's work' at the Air
Ministry seemed in danger; and the other was that he be released as
promptly if unrest in India suggested that he would be 'more useful'
there in a role for which he considered himself eminently suited-as
viceroy.
While awaiting either call, Trenchard submitted to parliament a plan
of reform in May 1933 which the government implemented. A police
college and forensic laboratory were to be opened at Hendon, and a
system of short-service engagements was to be created for a proportion
of officers (who, like some young pilots, were assumed to fancy a
spell at the sharp end). As in the RAF, he emphasized careful
selection, thorough training, and efficient working methods, and
recognized a need to widen the social base from which policemen were
recruited. He showed an uncommon concern for the overall well-being of
the force, rescuing the provident fund from disaster and agitating for
both better housing and sporting facilities. He introduced wireless
cars and a central control room to deal with the information received.
Unfortunately, Trenchard had long been an enlightened despot and could
not change his ways. He issued orders and resented suggestions that he
discuss them first. Most senior officers believed he wished to
militarize them. He found himself at a loss in dealing with the Police
Federation, a powerful and articulate union that had no counterpart in
the armed services. By 1934 he was already eager to resign, but he
hung on at the king's particular request until July 1935. As a reward
he was made a viscount in January 1936. His successor-Sir Philip Game,
his own nominee-did not press forward his reforms and most of them
quickly lapsed.
Trenchard joined the board of the United Africa Company (part of the
Unilever group), which had interests in Nigeria, his old stamping
ground, and served as chairman from 1936 to 1953. After his death,
Lord Heyworth recalled that he:
was as interested in the views of a probationer after a first tour as
of a senior executive returning from a tour of inspection. He once
said that he had no use for people who were not willing to talk 'brain
to brain' regardless of status. (The Times, 21 Feb 1956)
Backstairs agitator, privileged spectator
When war broke out in September 1939, Trenchard was sixty-six: young
enough, he believed, to play an important part. Throughout the 1930s
he had constantly and volubly asserted the primacy of bombers over
fighters, as unconvinced as ever that fighters could successfully
resist them. The prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, declined Hoare's
recommendation in April 1940 that Trenchard be re-appointed chief of
the air staff. Churchill offered him command of Britain's home forces
in May and a role in military intelligence in November. Although he
wisely refused both offers, Trenchard was not inactive. In alliance
with John Salmond, he agitated secretly and effectively during 1940
for the replacement of Newall as chief of the air staff and of Dowding
as head of Fighter Command.
Trenchard composed a memorandum in May 1941 which completely misjudged
the German character. British morale, he believed, was secure under
bombardment, but 'the German nation is peculiarly susceptible to air
bombing', being unable to crack jokes while sheltering: an opinion
treated with more respect than it deserved by many admirers, among
them Portal, who succeeded Newall in October 1940 (Terraine, 263-4).
He wrote three papers on air power issues, published by the Air
Ministry in 1946, in which he insisted that the bomber remained the
central instrument of air power, and a strategic air offensive the
only proper function of that instrument. Most of his senior disciples
eventually lapsed (in practice if not in theory) from the true faith,
but not Harris, head of Bomber Command, 1942-5.
From 1942 onwards Trenchard enjoyed the role of privileged spectator
and potential morale booster. He invited himself to every battlefield
in the Mediterranean and north-west European theatres, relishing the
deferential company of commanders whom he had encouraged in their
early days-Park, Coningham, Tedder, and Douglas-receiving firsthand
information about the progress of campaigns, and chatting amiably with
awed young airmen. After the war, he often spoke in the House of Lords
on air power issues, stoutly defending the RAF point of view, as he
interpreted it, against admirals and generals. He became a member of
the Order of Merit in January 1951, and received honorary doctorates
from Oxford and Cambridge and many other tokens of esteem.
A valiant man
In July 1920 Trenchard had married Katherine Isabel Salvin (d. 1959),
daughter of Edward Salvin Bowlby and widow of Captain the Hon. James
Boyle (killed in August 1914); Baring was his best man. She had three
sons from her first marriage (they all served in the armed forces
during the Second World War and two were killed) and two more from her
second: Hugh (born in 1921), who was killed in north Africa in 1943;
and Thomas (1923-1987), who succeeded as second viscount.
Trenchard was a big man, surprisingly clumsy for a successful
sportsman. Ruggedly handsome, he had a thick mop of unruly dark hair,
shaggy eyebrows, a moustache (which in old age gave him the appearance
of a friendly walrus), a direct glance, and a famously loud voice. He
had been virtually blind in his right eye since 1937, and was totally
blind during the last three years of his life, nearly deaf, sadly
crippled, but mentally alert until the end. He died in his London home
on 10 February 1956, one week after his eighty-third birthday, and
received a magnificent funeral in Westminster Abbey on 21 February.
Among the pallbearers were some outstanding airmen-Portal, Tedder,
Harris, and Douglas-whose careers owed much to his support. The RAF
ensign flew above the abbey while the coffin containing his ashes was
conveyed from the Air Ministry's assembly hall in Whitehall Gardens
(where it had lain in state) and throughout the service. Overhead flew
the RAF's latest strategic bomber, appropriately named Valiant.
If Trenchard 'had not taken up flying when youth had already passed
him the Royal Air Force would not have been the bulwark of Britain
that it was in either world war' (The Times, 11 Feb 1956; 22 Feb
1956). A bronze statue made by William McMillan and erected in
Embankment Gardens, outside the Ministry of Defence, was unveiled by
prime minister Harold Macmillan on 19 July 1961 and dedicated by the
archbishop of Canterbury. Lord Tedder, a great airman whom Trenchard
had always admired, laid a wreath on behalf of all former members of
the RAF. A plaque has commemorated his birthplace since September 1973.
Vincent Orange
Sources A. Boyle, Trenchard: man of vision (1962) + H. M. Hyde,
British air policy between the wars, 1918-1939 (1976) + G. Lyall,
'MRAF Lord Trenchard', The war lords, ed. M. Carver (1976), 176-81 +
M. Baring, RFC headquarters (1920) + Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel
Hoare), Empire of the air: the advent of the air age, 1922-1929 (1957)
+ W. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The war in the air, 6 vols. (1922-37) +
H. Probert, High commanders of the Royal Air Force (1991) + J.
Terraine, The right of the line: the Royal Air Force in the European
war (1984) + A. S. G. Lee, No parachute: a fighter pilot in World War
I (1968) + E. Letley, Maurice Baring: a citizen of Europe (1991) + M.
Smith, British air strategy between the wars (1984) + A. Morris, First
of the many: the story of the independent force, RAF (1968) + C. G.
Grey, 'On the departing chief', The Aeroplane, 37 (1929), 1402-16 + R.
Johns, 'Trenchard memorial lecture', RUSI Journal, 142 (Oct 1997),
10-16 + H. A. Taylor, Fairey aircraft since 1915 (1974) + The Times
(11 Feb 1956) + Lord Trenchard, Three papers on air power, Air
Ministry Publication, 229 (1946)
Archives Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, department of research and
information services, corresp. and papers | BL OIOC, letters to Sir W.
R. Lawrence, MS Eur. F 143 + BL OIOC, letters to Lord Reading, MSS
Eur. E 238, F 118 + Bodl. Oxf., corresp. with Lord Simon + Bodl. RH,
corresp. with Lord Lugard + CUL, corresp. with Samuel Hoare + Parl.
Arch., corresp. with Herbert Samuel + King's Lond., Liddell Hart C.,
corresp. with Sir B. H. Liddell Hart + PRONI, letters to Lord
Londonderry + U. Glas., Archives and Business Records Centre, letters
to Lord Rowallan FILM BFI NFTVA, news footage
Likenesses F. Dodd, charcoal and watercolour drawing, 1917, IWM · W.
Orpen, oils, 1917, IWM [see illus.] · W. Stoneman, two photographs,
1919-32, NPG · O. Birley, oils, c.1926, Royal Air Force Club, London ·
B. Partridge, chalk caricature, 1927, NPG · H. Green, pencil drawing,
1930, Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell, Berkshire · E.
Verpilleux, oils, 1936, Royal Air Force College, Cranwell,
Lincolnshire · A. R. Thomson, oils, c.1943, Royal Air Force Staff
College, Bracknell, Berkshire · F. Beresford, oils, Royal Air Force
Bentley Priory, Stanmore, Middlesex, HQ 11 Group · W. McMillan, bronze
statue, Embankment Gardens, London; plaster statuette and bronze cast,
Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon · photograph, repro. in Boyle,
Trenchard, facing p. 609
Wealth at death £3576 12s. 11d.: probate, 11 May 1956, CGPLA Eng. &
Wales
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